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DECONSTRUCTION AND MARXISM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND SOCIETY
Michael McQuade*
The law in its majestic impartiality forbids rich and poor alike to
sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and steal bread.
Anatole France!
Let us pretend that two people, one a Marxist political theorist
and the other a deconstructionist literary theorist, come across a sign
bearing the above epigram from Anatole France. The Marxist theorist
interprets the sign from a politico-economic perspective and concludes
that 'law reflects the interest of the ruling class, and is a means of
perpetuating a social order.' The deconstructionist theorist says, 'this
sign reflects the prevailing ontological and epistemological perspectives,
in thatitaccepts both the existence ofa thing called 'law' per se, and that
the world consists of a series of oppositional pairs' (here, for example, rich
and poor).
At first glance, these two opinions do not seem to have much in
common, nor are their implications for law obvious. Yet, both have much
to offer contemporary legal studies. Each, in its own way, brings to light
some of the unarticulated biases which support both the existing legal
tradition and society at large.
The basic theories of deconstruction and Marxism and their
respective implications for society are outlined first. In brief, both are
critical of hegemonies evident in liberal capitalist society: the
deconstructionist of structuralist epistemology, and the Marxist of
capitalism. From this it should become evident that the two are not as
dissimilar as they might seem at the outset. Their similarity will be
made more explicit as the implications of each for legal theory are
explored. Specifically, I shall compare the deconstructionist and Marxist theories on the origin oflaw, the functions oflaw, and the future of
law. It is proposed that not only will these two schools arrive at many
of the same conclusions about the present state oflaw, but that they both
point to a new way of viewing law and society.

DECONSTRUCTION: THE TEXT AND SOCIETY
It is commonly thought that Jacques Derrida founded the 'school' of
deconstructionist literary theory in France in the 1950s. However,
Derrida himself would say that such a statement would involve a
displacement- a misreading- of his work insofar as it seems to suggest
that literature and literary theory can be viewed in isolation from the
society in which they exist. Central to Derrida's work is the notion that
there is nothing outside of the text. This will require elaboration. In
order to place deconstruction in its proper context, however, a brief
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history of semiotics (the interpretation of signs and symbols) and literary
theory is required.
Any discussion of literary theory must begin, however briefly,
with Ferdinand de Saussure's 1916 magnum opus Course in General
Linguistics. Briefly, de Saussure rejected the view that language was to
be viewed 'diachronically'- that is, in its historical development- in
favour ofa 'synchronic' approach.2 De Saussure had two main points: (1)
at any point in time, language is a complete set of written and oral
symbols; and (2) the written word is somehow more valuable than the
spoken word.
First, in de Saussure's model, language is, at any given point in
time, a complete system of symbols. Each symbol, or sign as is more
commonly used, consists of a "signifier" (a sound-image or, more usually,
its graphic equivalent) and a signified (the thing or concept represented).3 De Saussure's model begins, then, from a standard western
metaphysical perspective which privileges 'presence'; it begins with the
acceptance, in Platonic terms, of an archetype or universal which the
mind immediately grasps.4 In applying this to semiotics, it means that
the three letters d, o, and g, when arranged in that order represent to the
mind a four-legged domestic animal, the canine.
Second, de Saussure divided systems of communication into two
parts, langue and parole. In structuralist thought, langue, meaning both
the written word and the system of laws governing those words, is
privileged over parole, the verbal articulation and communication of a
community:
Saussure argued that langue was the more important
element in the understanding of language because the
system ofrelations among various signs is what constitutes a language. Specific examples of parole, that is
specific speech acts by speakers in a linguistic community, are only possible because of the preexisting langue
that speakers unconsciously rely upon to understand
each other.5
Such a view was consistent with de Saussure's basic aim of
articulating a science oflanguage; it is easier to study what can be seen
(langue) than what can not (parole).
In various formulations, these basic dualisms- signifier/signified, langue/parole, and synchronic/diachronic- formed the basis of
structuralist semiotics. Structuralism held the day almost unchallenged until the 1950s when a few literary theorists brought their critical
focus to bear on their own discipline. The first to do so was Northrop Frye
who challenged the 'ahistoricity' of the structuralist approach by attemptingto place the structuralist constructs within a definite historical
context. 6 The most significant attack, however, came shortly after when
Derrida questioned the metaphysical underpinnings of the structuralist
beliefs.7
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The notion of 'relativity' was always present in structuralist
theorizing- in fact, it was central to it. For the structuralists this
relativism was essential for definition- the signifier 'cat' represented the
signified 'cat' by virtue of being other than 'hat' or 'car' or anything else.
However, it was not until Derrida that people began to fully realize the
implications of the fact that the 'signified' does not correspond neatly to
any one signifier, but only to what it is not.
Central to Of Grammatology, Derrida's study of the writing of
Jean Jacques Rousseau, is the notion that standard metaphysics consists of defining the world in terms of binary opposites (e.g., light/dark,
good/bad, etc.), one of which is taken to be the original and model, and the
other subordinate and derivative.s At the same time that it is derived
from the original, the latter is the opposite of, and therefore a threat to,
the former. If the first is valued, the second can legitimately be
suppressed. 9 One should begin to see the legal and political implications
of the traditional metaphysic.
In Derrida's view, this system ofprioratization is problematic. In
its place he proposes a new theory which seeks to avoid such prioratization.
Central to his theory are the concepts of 'differance', 'trace' and
'supplementarity'. Each of these will be discussed in turn.
While for structuralists the notion of difference was something
to be overcome, for Derrida it provides the key to understanding. Derrida
termed this 'differance'. "The French word 'differance' is a neologism
that combines two verbs - to differ, as in spatial distinction or relation to
another, and to defer, as in temporalizing delay."10 This relation- "the
inscription of other-relations is the self same"- Derrida describes as
"radical alterity".11
Derrida begins with, but ultimately rejects, the underlying
Western Platonic notion ofidentity.12 Western philosophy has always
begun with and assumed identity as the basis for metaphysical thought:
anything is identical to itself; if two things are different
they are not identical to each other. While this seems
reasonable, it is here that the deconstructionist critique
begins ...
The deconstructionist wants to show that the notion of identity,
which seems so basic, so 'present', actually depends upon difference
because a thing cannot be identical to something unless it can be
different from something else. Identity is only comprehensible in terms
of difference, just as difference can only be understood in terms of
identity.13
Thus Derrida deconstructs the notion that one half of any binary
system is necessarily dominant and original while the other is independent of, and subordinate to, the former. Not surprisingly, since this
metaphysic underlies de Saussure's languelparole dichotomy, it too can
be deconstructed.
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If, as we have seen, langue and parole are not two discrete
notions, but only, analogically, two sides of the same coin, this begs the
question of the origin of language:

Language must have begun with speech acts, and through
history the collection of past speech acts (parole) was
consolidated to create a linguistic system (langue). On
the other hand, speech acts could not have been understood without some pre-existing structure ... No matter
how far back we go into history, each speech act seems
to require a pre-existing linguistic and semantic structure in order to be intelligible, but any such structure
could not come into being without a history of preexisting speech acts by past speakers. Neither langue
nor parole could be a foundational concept in a theory of
language because each is mutually dependent upon the
existence of the other.14
How then do we get around this problem of identity/ nonidentity? Simply stated, we don't need to; the problem of identity/nonidentity, it follows logically, can and must be both the problem and the
solution simultaneously. This is the notion of 'differance' of which we
have already spoken.
Recalling that 'differance' meant both spatial and temporal
distinction which exists between words, this leads Derrida to another
important concept: the differential relation of alterity, which he titles
'trace':
The word 'trace' is a metaphor for the effect of the
opposite concept, which is no longer present but has left
its mark on the concept we are now considering. The
trace is what makes deconstruction possible; by identifying the traces of the concepts in each other, we identify
their mutual conceptual dependence. 15
Although he labels this differential relationship, Derrida resists
the attempt to privilege even it metaphysically; in Derrida's theory
neither differance nor trace can be allowed to dominate. From this,
Derrida derives his theory of 'supplementarity'.
In Of Grammatology Derrida critiques the hierarchy of speech
over writing through 'the logic of the supplement'. The term 'supplement' derives from Rousseau who described writing as a 'supplement' to
speech; Rousseau believed that the natural state of language was
spoken, with the written word evolving from speech.16 We have already
seen one problem with this view, but here the social consequences of such
a view become obvious through Derrida's notion of'supplementarity'.
The word 'supplement' has many meanings, only two of which
concern us here: it can mean "something added to an already complete
or self-sufficient thing", but it can also mean "something added to

91

DECONSTRUCTION AND MARXISM
something lacking in order to make it complete." 17 Given Rousseau's
onto-theology (namely, his Platonic tendencies) he could only have
intended the former meaning. In fact, this is confirmed by Rousseau who
feared that writing "might infect the purity of speech."18 But, Derrida
suggests, this is problematic. Speech can not be, as Rousseau suggests,
whole and pure because logically writing can only supplement speech if
speech is already lacking something (even if that lacuna is only the
supplement of speech).
Thus speech is not pure and writing impure, or a mediation of
speech. Speech is, like writing, only a supplement of something else
(thought), and obviously an incomplete representation of it. This leads
to an obvious problem: if speech is a supplement, that which it supplements must also be lacking. The result is a chain of supplementarity ad
infinitum. This allows Derrida, in what J. Balkin calls "the ultimate
deconstruction of presence",19 to proclaim that:
[T]here is nothing outside of the text ... What we have
tried to show by following the guiding line of the "dangerous supplement," is that in what one calls .... real life ...
there has never been anything but writing; there have
never been anything but supplements, substitutive
significations which could only come forth in a chain of
differential references ... [T]he absolute present, Nature, ... ha[s] always already escaped, ha[s] never
existed.2°
So far, it has been suggested that the Derridean notion of
differance allows one to deconstruct words and the philosophical constructs which support them. Adopting Derrida's supplementarity notion, one can then move on to deconstruct metaphysical principles
underlying society, and ultimately then, society itself. In "The White
Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy" - his study of Anatole
France's The Garden ofEpicurus - Derrida gives an example of how this
might be accomplished.21
Derrida titles the first section of "White Mythology" 'exergue'
which has both a numismatic meaning, namely "the space on a coin ...
reserved for inscription", and an epigraphical meaning of something
"outside,the work."22 Similarly, he subtitles the first section 'usure' a
word which has two meanings, one economic and the other linguistic.
'Usure' in French means both the acquisition of too much interest, and
using up or deterioration through usage.23 These 'latent' connections
between language and economics are soon made manifest.
In The Garden of Epicurus, Polyphilos and Aristos carry on a
conversation in which the former ruminates on the grinding down of
coins until nothing, not even the sovereign image, is visible in their
crown pieces. He suggests that "metaphysicians, when they make a
language for themselves, are like ... knife-grinders" who, by erasing the
images of the sovereign attempt to free the crown pieces from all limits
of time and space.24 But Polyphilos is anxious to retrieve the capital to
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restore the" 'original figure' of the coin which has been worn away ... in
the circulation of the philosophical concept."25 Thus, Derrida concludes,
it is the very possibility ofrestoring, beneath the metaphor which hides
it, the 'original figure' of the coin which is central to the metaphysics.
The primitive meaning is physical. This meaning becomes
metaphorical when philosophy puts it into circulation. At that point,
however, "the first meaning and the first displacement are then forgotten. The metaphor is no longer noticed, and it is taken for the proper
meaning." 26 France titles this co-option of the primitive meaning,
'White Mythology'. Derrida asserts that Western thought acts in such
a manner by seeking to escape appearances, but is condemned then to
live "in a world of allegory":
Metaphysics - the white mythology which reassembles
and reflects the culture of the West: the white man takes
his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own
logos, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal
form of that he must still wish to call Reason .... White
Mythology- metaphysics has erased within itself the
fabulous scene that has produced it, the scene that
nevertheless remains active and stirring, inscribed in
white ink, an invisible design covered over in the
palimpsest. 27
The influence of these theories has not stopped at the edge of
literary theory. Clearly these theories exist in society because they
support society. By deconstructing the metaphysical grounding upon
which society rests, Derrida seeks to bring society itself into the critical
discourse.
Deconstruction begins with, but ultimately rejects, the traditional Western notions of ontology (the study of being) and epistemology
(the study of knowledge and reality). Rather, deconstructionism begins
with a critique of traditional formalist literary theory, and through the
notions ofradical alterity, differance, supplementarity and trace, posits
an entirely new manner of perceiving literature and ultimately the
world. Broadly speaking, the deconstructionist critique of structuralism
is that it seeks to overcome difference by the imposition of a literary and
social system which is based ultimately on physics, and is, to that degree,
rationally unsupportable. It sees everything as meaning distinct but not
discrete. Everything is related ultimately through the chain of
supplementarity. In both its critique of metaphysics, and its emphasis
on the oppositions that exist within society, one can see the similarities
to Marxist theory.

MARXISM: ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY
It is commonly held that it is impossible to speak of the orthodox
Marxism. At best, one can speak of an orthodox Marxism; a theory which
is not inconsistent with that which Marx wrote. One is not surprised to
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encounter such a problem in discussing a 'Marxist theory of law' since
Marx, in spite of his university training in law, never completed a
systematic study oflaw.28 Rather, he alluded often but usually briefly
and indirectly to the role of law in the development of the capitalist
economy. As many recent writers have suggested, however, this indeterminacy applies also to Marx's more purely economic writings. It is with
them that we must begin our discussion.
The main notion derived from the writing of Marx is that society
is economically determined. Economic relationships, or more accurately
relationships to the control of the means of production, dominate society.
Central to any Marxist theory is 'the base/superstructure metaphor':
In the social production of their life, men enter into
definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material
productive forces. The sum total of these relations of
production constitutes the economic structure of society,
the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms
of social consciousness.29
Yet, even this passage which is at the heart of any Marxist analysis has
not been free from problems of interpretation.
Two mairi schools of Marxism have arisen and are divided on,
inter alia, the questions of the meanings of the base/structure metaphor
and the fetishism of commodities. Alvin Gouldner termed these schools
'scientific' and 'critical' Marxism. The former, he argues:
is grounded in the axiom of the Soviet Union's celebrated
metaphysic, "dialectical materialism." It interprets the
world in one way at all times, and, therefore, it remains
closed to new advances in philosophy and critical analysis, such as deconstruction.30
Conversely, critical Marxists tend to be characterized by a:
rejection of the model of authoritarian central state
communism. They favour models of socialism which are
dehierarchized, egalitarian and democratic. Whereas
the Soviet model privileges productive forces (technology, heavy industry, and the like) over relations, thus
permitting the preservation of capitalist work relations,
critical Marxists demand a complete transformation of
the form of work and of all social power relations.31
Here it is suggested that scientific Marxism is based on a
misreading of Marx's work. In reducing everything to economic rela-
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tions, scientific Marxists privilege economics philosophically in a manner which Marx himself could not have intended. Critical Marxism is not
only internally consistent in its emphasis on productive relations rather
than loci of production, but also is compatible with the deconstructionist
theory of radical alterity.
In Deconstructionism and Marxism Michael Ryan argues that a
common misreading of Marx's various writings "conflates them into a
homogeneous formula", which Ryan suggests, does not exist in reality.
Central to such misinterpretations is the displacement of Marx's statement in the Communist Manifesto that "the first step in the revolution
by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling
class" and "to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the
state, i.e., of the proletariat organized as a ruling class."32 Ryan argues
that Marx did not intend that the temporary rule of the proletariat
should be confused with the 'state' in the bourgeois sense of the word.
But this is evident even in parts of Lenin's reading of Marx:
The crucial displacement occurs in the next paragraph.
"By educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the
vanguard of the proletariat, capable of assuming power
and leading the whole people to socialism, of directing
and organizing the new system, of being the teacher, the
guide, the leader of all the working and exploited people"
... After establishing the "Marxist" definition of the state
as the "the proletariat organized as a ruling class,'' Lenin
substitutes the vanguard party for the proletariat. 33[emphasis deleted]
While Marx's view of society was fluid, and the need for a ruling
class was only a conduit to a truly socialist society, Lenin here seems to
suggest that a ruling class, (albeit one composed of proletariat), will be
necessary at all stages in social history if the revolution is to be given an
on-going effect.
The problem, obvious to both critical Marxists and
deconstructionists, is that if any segment of the proletariat is advanced
to the position of ruling elite, surely they are no longer proletariat.
Rather, they would have become de facto part of the ruling elite. Such
problems of interpretation continue to flourish. Another equally common difficulty that is no less problematic lies in the assertion that Marx
reduced all social relations to economics.
As support for the assertion that Marx would reject out of hand
such a reductive deterministic perspective, one need only look at the
work ofMarx's collaborator, Engels. While Engels wrote that "economic
base is determining only 'in the last instance' or 'in the final analysis"' ,3 4
in a letter to Block he also argued that "if somebody twists this ... into
saying that the economic factor is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase."35
Milovanovic writes:
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In Engels' letter to Borgius in 1894, Engels stated that
the economic condition "ultimately determines historical development"; however, although "political, legal,
philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development is based on economic development ... all these react
upon one another and also upon the economic base."
Further, he states, "one must think that the economic
situation is cause, and solely active, whereas everything
else is only passive effect. On the contrary, interaction
takes place on the basis of economic necessity, which
ultimately always asserts itself. 36
The key word in this passage then is 'determines'. As suggested, the two
schools of Marxism take different views on the meaning to be ascribed to
this word.
In his study of Marxist and Weberian notions of law, Dragan
Milovanovic distinguishes two notions of'determination' within Marxism. One school (which here has been called 'scientific Marxism' but
which he calls 'instrumentalist') defines 'determination' as "prediction,
i.e., some antecedent factor [which] totally predicts, or totally controlsprefigures- subsequent activity."37
The other school, which is favoured here and which he calls
structuralist, defines determination as the setting oflimits through the
exertion ofpressures.38 Importantly, these pressures are both internal
and external. Structuralism itself is divided into two schools, 'commodity exchange structuralism' and 'interpellative structuralism'. The
former sees the economic factors determining in the first instance, while
the latter "sees the economy determining only in the last instance; it is
the political and ideological structures that have primal effect."39 This
notion of three relatively discrete forces acting in society - politics,
ideology and economics-is called by Poulantzas (the leadinginterpellative
Marxist legal theorist) and Althusser (a prominent Marxist theorist) the
theory of 'overdetermination'.40
While the former definition of determinism is exclusionary, in
that it excludes the second, the latter definition can, with slight modification, exist without excluding the former. If one accepts the instrumentalist definition, powerlessness is assumed; people are not actors, but
powerless receptors of economic laws. While this stems partly from a
reductive reading of the writings of Marx and Engels, it may also be
attributable to the bias within the English translation.41 However, a
fundamentally different view develops from an understanding of the
interpellative notion of 'inherent determinism'.
In his letter to Block, to which reference was made earlier,
Engels wrote that "we make history ourselves, but, in the first place,
under very definite assumptions and conditions."42 Here the notions
that 'we make history ourselves' and 'the necessity of definite conditions'
are equally important. 'Determination' implies not only being subject to
the forces of economics and history, but also an act of purpose or will. The
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two meanings of determination are thus clearly distinct, not necessarily
mutually exclusive:
Here, determination means that the first factor qualifies, or sets the limits to the second. Subjectivity is
restored. It is not that the individual is a passive
recipient and reactor; rather, the person finds him/
herself constrained, somewhat, by the historical conditions s/he is born into; meaning, that above all else, it is
the "exertiol). of pressure" by external factors that is
equated with the notion of determinism. But these
interact with the subject's desires, wants, capacities,
abilities (in formulating projects), and strivings (in transcending existing conditions, including by means of
oppositional praxis).43 [emphasis deleted]
With this understanding of determination and working backwards to the base/superstructure metaphor, one can see that a
'deconstructive' reading of Marxism (that is, beginning with, but not
privileging 'determinism', which is itself accomplished by always keeping in mind the larger context in which it exists) suggests that the
scientific/instrumentalist understanding of Marx is fundamentally a
misunderstanding of Marx's writings. It onto-theologizes economic
factors. Only the critical interpellative view of Marx's work allows one
to escape antinomies and thus a recourse to metaphysics. In the sense
that it sees economics as both 'supplementing' and 'supplemented by'
other factors, one of which shall be seen to be law, interpellative Marxism
is compatible with Derrida's understanding of deconstruction.
In summarizing Marx's contribution to social theory, there is a
tendency to think of the modern Soviet applications of 'economic determinism' and the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. To do so would be to do
violence- indeed an injustice- to the theories of Marx. As Marx suggests
in his Manifesto, the key to Marxist theory is not the loci of production,
but the relations of production. This is the only understanding of Marx's
dialectic that is logically consistent with the rest of his work.
Just as Marx's dialectic demands a fluidity of economic relationships, it demands a similarly malleable notion of society in general. This
has two main implications for Marxist theoreticians. First, as the
interpellative Marxists suggest, economics cannot determine society
absolutely; rather economics interacts dialectically with superstructural
forces like law and politics to produce society. Second, as Gouldner
suggests, there must be a transformation of all social power relations
from reified and hierarchical to fluid and egalitarian. In both its critique
of scientific Marxism's reliance on a 'metaphysical' reading of the
material dialectic and its reified social theory, critical or structuralist
Marxism shares much with Derrida's understanding of deconstruction.
This is evidenced in their respective views on the law.
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DECONSTRUCTION, MARXISM, AND LAW
Capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of nature, its
own negation.
Karl Marx44
Derrida's work manifests a clear understanding of the Hegelian
dialectic,45 but like many European academics of his generation, he
came to reject this classical dialectic because of what he perceived as its
metaphysical nature. Derrida was following in a rather well- worn path.
After his initial period in the Young Hegelians, Marx also
rejected Hegel's notion of the historical dialectic. In spite of this similarity, early in his career Derrida rejected the Marxist as well as Hegelian
dialectic- and for the same reason! The year 1971, however, brought the
now famous interview with Scarpetti and Houdebine in which Derrida
was criticized publicly for ignoring the commonalities with Marx, and
the social utility of deconstruction. 46 This seems to have signalled a shift
in Derrida's outward attitude towards Marxism, although as shall be
seen later, his notion of the origin oflanguage from O{Grammatology is
compatible with Marxist theory even if not framed in classical Marxist
jargon.
By 1972 Marxist jargon had begun appearing in Derrida's work.
In 1976 he spoke explicitly on the role that deconstruction might play in
exposing ideology. By 1979 he publicly described himself as a Marxist. 47
Why the change? There is no clear answer, but it appears that Derrida's
notion of deconstruction itself did not change, but rather it is his
understanding of Marxism which has evolved. Although Heidegger,
Nietzsche, and Freud are the obvious influences on Derrida's early
writing (Freud's role will be explained later), in the later works, Nietzsche
and Freud are joined by Marx as the dominant figures.
This paper has thus far suggested that scientific Marxism is both
a misreading of Marx, and incompatible with a deconstructive epistemology. The next step is to suggest that such an epistemology is
compatible with the critical Marxist school of thought. In Marxism and
Deconstructionism Michael Ryan has argued for just such a point.
Al though Ryan develops a full-blown social theory based on both Marxist
and deconstructionist notions, here one needs only to outline his first
point: Derrida and Marx develop compatible social theories because they
share a similar criticism of metaphysics.
Although they operated in different fields, Marx and Derrida
share many critical tools: the concepts of relation, difference, and
antagonism. This leads inevitably to similar results when they discuss
common subjects, such as the critiques of positivism and idealism. In his
introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx speaks of the concept or category
of "production in general". But production he says is not a thing; it is a
series or segment of relations which Marx calls 'essential difference'. 48
The similarities to Derrida's notion of radical alterity are obvious:
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For Marx, once alterity, the relation to the other which
is "internal" to the thing (production), is taken into
account, one arrives at a full concrete determination, as
opposed to an empty abstraction. It should be noted that
the word "determination" [Bestimmung] does not mean
a self-identical "thing", but instead a locus of relations
whereby something is constituted by or in relationship
to other determinations.49
Although it has been suggested here that Derrida shared this
notion of 'radical alterity' with other thinkers, the striking lack of a
meta physic in the critical Marxist reading renders it the most akin to the
deconstructionist approach. This similarity carries over into their
respective critiques oflaw and society.
Some people can imagine approximately what a Marxist theory
of law might encompass. Fewer would probably be able to envision a
deconstructionist theory oflaw. In brief, the latter rejects as metaphysical any law or legal construct which is based upon unassailable first
principles. Such a theory as well as an interpellative Marxist theory of
law will be outlined; these two theories are proved to be similar and
mutually supporting.50 Specifically, an examination of three aspects of
law is adopted: the origin oflaw(s); the functioning oflaw in society; and
the future oflaw. It will be evident that, although, for the purposes of
clarity, these three notions are treated as distinct, there is necessarily
considerable overlap among them.

THE ORIGIN OF LAW
Deconstruction and the Origin of Law
In the deconstruction of Rousseau's theory of the ongm of
language, Derrida in Of Grammatology begins to develop a theory on the
origin and function oflaw.
In The Social Contract Rousseau declares a centre- "one single
origin, one single point in the history oflanguages."51 He speaks of the
movement during 'primitive times' from the development of 'no language' to an 'almost language' (signs used amongst family, and even
then, only infrequently) to language (a full set of signs and symbols).
According to Rousseau, this accompanied the development of more
complex social organizations, from families to clans to tribes. Rousseau
calls this period, when people came together and understood each other,
the 'time offestivals'. But Derrida draws our attention first to the time
before the festival:

What then! Before that time did men spring from the
earth? Did generations succeed each other without any
union of the sexes, and without anyone being understood? No: there were families, but there were no
nations. There were domestic, but not popular, Ian-
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guages. There were marriages but there was no love at
all. Each family was self-sufficient and perpetuated
itself by inbreeding. Children of the same parents grew
up together and gradually they found ways of expressing
themselves to each other: the sexes became obvious with
age; natural inclination sufficed to unite them. Instinct
held the place of passion; habit held the place of preference. They became husband and wife without ceasing to
be brother and sister.52
This non-prohibition, however, is interrupted after the festival.
While the festival is the "moment of pure continuity, of in-difference
between the time of desire and the time of pleasure", the age that follows
is the age of"the supplement, of articulation, of signs, ofrepresentatives.
That is the age of the prohibition ofincest."53 In Rousseau's model, this
prohibition is the beginning of law.
Rousseau ascribes to society "a sacred and holy character only to
the natural voice, ... the natural law ... , it is, ... the social order itself, the
right oflaw."54 Recognizing family as the original or 'natural' organization, society cannot maintain its prohibition except "by convention".55
As Derrida suggests, however, this displacement of the father figure by
society does not follow smoothly; "the political father no longer loves his
children, the element of the law sets him apart"56:
Rousseau consecrates convention only on one condition:
that one might universalize it and consider it, even ifit
were the artifice of artifices, as a quasi-natural law
conforming to nature. That is exactly the case with this
prohibition. It is also the case of the order of that first
and unique convention, or that first unanimity to which,
the Contract tells us "we must always go back" for
understanding the possibility oflaw. The origin oflaws
must be a law.57 [emphasis deleted]
To make the point clear, Derrida suggests that the two arguments are heterogeneous; neither the prohibition nor the morality can
be the first cause. He states, "neither of the two is intrinsically pertinent
to the argument: the morality that condemns incest is constituted from
the interdict, the former has its origin in the latter."58 From this one can
derive two important principles.
First, as Derrida suggests, law does not exist in the Platonic
sense; there is no 'essential law' in the universe just waiting to be derived
and applied. Law is created and imposed by society. Second, not only is
the nature of law prohibitive, but also it is permissive. Law only
prohibits certain actions to the degree that it imposes other actions in
their place. Thus Derrida questions not only the metaphysical underpinnings of the traditional understanding oflaw, but also its very definition.
At this juncture, some may begin to question whether in the
deconstructive model iflaw is ultimately reducible to politics. Iflaw is
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not a fully autonomous set of rules, is it simply arbitrary, or nothing more
than politics in another form? In "Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation" Michel Rosenfeld also asks these questions, and answers clearly
'no' to both.59 Admitting a certain degree ofindeterminancy, Rosenfeld
suggests that this answer need not lead inevitably to arbitrariness or a
morass of uncertainty. He suggests that within traditional society,
indeterminancy (particularly in economics) is already established as a
key notion. These two points will be discussed in turn.
To many, deconstruction is something of a semantic parlour
game; by denying anything its unity, it is thought to deny everything.
Yet Rosenfeld suggests that a careful balance can be achieved- between
past and future, inclusion and exclusion, theory and practice- so that
deconstruction can accept meaning without recourse to arbitrariness:
Because the requirements of ontology and those of ethics
are inscribed in history- that is, because they leave their
mark on the succession of concrete historical social
formations - at every moment, they constrain the range
of possible legitimate meanings without ever imposing a
single, fully determinate meaning. Hence, ontology and
ethics, which are always projected both towards the past
and towards the future, constantly open and close possible paths of interpretation without ever settling on any
single, distinct, clearly articulated and exhaustively
circumscribed. 60
Thus, although law, politics, and ethics, are related, they are
also three distinct semantic and historical notions. To those critics who
suggest that society could not agree on something as intangible or
ethereal as meaning, Rosenfeld suggests not only that it could do so, but
also that in market exchanges it already has.
Rosenfeld analogizes the agreement on semantic exchange with
agreement on economic exchange within the marketplace. Each commodity has both an use value and an exchange value; the former is what
value each person places on a good for his or her own use, and the latter
is the value he or she thinks another might value it at (and so, what
another would be willing to exchange for it).61 Although use and
exchange values change with circumstance, itis suggested that these
values, while clearly not objective, are not merely based on subjective
whims:
Upon closer scrutiny, the values of commodities on the
rudimentary market are no more purely subjective than
they are strictly speaking objective on the fully developed market. In both cases, such values are
intersubjective as they are the product of a combination
of, or a compromise between, the diverse subjective
desires which seek fulfillment through market transactions. 62
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That this theory is consonant with many of the notions found in
Derrida's work is not surprising. In fact, Rosenfeld's paper was written
for a symposium on deconstruction and the law at which Derrida was the
keynote speaker. Nor is it surprising that a deconstructionist theory
should move so easily among linguistics, legal theory, and economics;
such is expected for a theory which denies the absolute autonomy of each
of these disciplines, but sees them all as necessarily connected. Derrida
is emphatic in stressing the social utility of deconstruction in "Force of
Law," his keynote address to the 1989 Cardozo Law Symposium.63
Derrida himself has long resisted the 'American' interpretations
of his work. In particular, he has objected to the manner in which the
American 'deconstructionist' literary critics (beginning with the Yale
critics) have misinterpreted his work to support a reactionary epistemology and social-structure. 64 Somewhat surprisingly in light of this, his
address to the Cardozo symposium commended the largely American
Critical Legal Studies (hereinafter CLS) movement. This is because,
unlike the American literary critics, the CLS scholars were expanding
the applications, if not the limits, of his work by moving into the world
without necessarily going outside the non-existent limits of the text:
If hypothetically, it had a proper place, which is pre-

cisely what cannot be the case, such a deconstructive
"questioning" or meta-questioning would be more at
home in law schools, ... than in philosophy departments
and much more than in the literature departments
where it has often been thought to belong.65
Why law? Law, although related to semiotics, has a direct and
unmediated bearing on social life in a way that a discipline such as
literary studies could not.
It is the notion of praxis, particularly transformative praxis,
central to so much of the CLS work, that most commends the movement
to Derrida. He continues:
They respond, ... to the most radical programs of a
deconstruction that would like, in order to be consistent
with itself, not to remain closed in purely speculative,
theoretical, academic discourses but rather ... to aspire
to something more consequential, to change (1) things
and to intervene in the efficient and responsible though
always, of course, very mediated way, not only in the
profession but in what one calls the cite, the polis and
more generally the world.66 [emphasis deleted]
The similarity here to Marx's rebuke of Hegelianism- that the
point of philosophy is not to interpret the world, but to change it67 is too
obvious to be accidental. That Derrida echoes Marx is not surprising;
indeed, as suggested above, the deconstructionist and Marxist theories
on the origin oflaw are very similar.
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Marxism and the Origins of Law
As noted, Marx did not write a comprehensive theory oflaw. In
fact, no such systematic Marxist theory of law existed until 1904 when
Karl Renner published The Institutions of Private Law. Renner concluded from his study of the private law realm that "economic change
does not immediately and automatically bring about changes in the
law."68 While, it shall be argued here that such a view of relative
autonomy oflaw is the only valid view, it was not immediately accepted
by all. The most influential of the early Marxist legal theorists was
Evgeny Pashukanis whose work would today be considered to be part of
the 'commodity exchange school'.
Pashukanis published The General Theory ofLaw and Marxism
in 1924, but his notion of the "withering away of state and law" was not
favoured under the Stalinist regime. 69 Consequently, Pashukanis' ideas
were suppressed, but he has since been restored to the position of one of
the fathers of Marxist jurisprudence. Although rejected here for being
overly deterministic, his "commodity exchange theory of law" which
argues that economics determines law in the first instance is still
accepted by some.70 It has been surpassed, however, in achievement by
more contemporary views which take their lead from Renner's work.
'Interpellative structuralist Marxism' came to the fore in the
1970s. This school argues that the political and ideological superstructures are relatively autonomous from the economic base, and that the
interaction of all three determines the shape of society. This multicausal explanation of society is called the theory of over-determination.71
An overdeterministic analysis of law in capitalist society must
be sensitive to the dynamics of commodity exchange; it does not,
however, argue that legal reform is a reflex of economic change. Thus
interpellative-structuralist Marxism (hereinafter, simply referred to as
Marxism) differs from instrumentalist Marxism in that the former sees
economics as being but one factor operating in relation to others including law, which determine the shape of society. Thus Marxism distinguishes itself from traditional capitalism in two important ways. First,
it rejects capitalism's self-understanding as a system of economics
governed by rational and equitable rules; and second, it rejects the
underlying assumption that law is an autonomous and apolitical factor
influencing society from the outside.
In the capitalist system, law is normally seen as being rational.
Rationality in law means both a non-contradictory sense of principles, as
well as a system which is logically connected to the economic system. As
Duncan Kennedy demonstrates, however, this 'rationalism' is a clearly
qualified rationality:
[F]irst ... this body of economic thought is incomprehensible unless it is treated as an aspect of a larger totality.
The most important non-economic element in that totality is legal thought. Second, the totality functioned
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ideologically: it operated as a legitimator of oppression. 72
Kennedy thus clearly calls into question the two notions stated above
that are often thought to underlie the capitalist notion oflaw.
Law arises in the capitalist economy to regulate the exchange of
commodities. Neither the notion of the marketplace nor the capitalist
valuation of commodity is natural, but rather both are products of social
convention and law. In order to have the value of their own commodity
guaranteed, each person must agree to a value of the other person's
commodities. All must agree to a common system of rules to govern
exchange, or a system of'equivalency'. As the market becomes central,
the rationality and predictability central to exchange norms governing
the market transactions become more formalized. In Marxist terminology, law developed in conjunction with a society which developed from
one concerned with 'use values' in trade to one with 'exchange values'. 73
The notion of capital developed from one which was based on an
object's use (which depended upon a particular historical situation), to
one based on an abstract notion of equivalence. A pound of wheat could
be traded for a dozen eggs because the latter was useful at that time and
had only a limited life-span (because they would spoil, and would lose
their usefulness shortly). Conversely, capitalism allowed one, if a buyer
could be found, to transfer goods into capital that could not spoil. In this
way, history was transcended. Similarly, the law which developed this
'ahistorical' notion of capitalism was also necessarily seen to transcend
history. Here, the Platonic ideal underlying capitalism is evident.
A simplification of a Marxist critique of law into its elements
would suggest that the 'fetishization of capital' allowed those who had
control of goods at the beginning of capitalism to extend this hegemony
into the future. This required a notion of law which would govern not
only present actions but also future actions, since capitalism demanded
an 'ahistorical' market. Thus developed a notion of law governing
commerce which was seen to transcend the particular historical situation and relation in which it existed. To adopt the language of the
deconstructionist, neither law nor capitalism can be posited as a first
cause, and neither can be seen as complete in and of itself. Thus,
capitalism required the law as a supplement.
In the Marxist view of the development of law then, law is
rationalizing and performative; it explains why someone can do something (monopolize capital) which economics would suggest should not be
done. At the same time, law does not so much preclude actions as much
as it forces compliance under threat of penalty. This analysis is very
similar to Derrida's critique of Rousseau's view of the origin oflaw; law
not only prohibits certain action, but forces an acceptance of other forms
of socio-political or economic relations.
In the Marxist perspective then, modern law developed initially
in conjunction with a system oflaissez-faire capitalism and provided the
justification for that early form of capitalism. As capitalism evolved, so
too did the system oflaw. Yet if we cannot assert a definite causal link
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here- that economic changes caused a change in the law or vice versahow can the Marxist theory of the necessity of capitalism to evolve be
explained? This has been done through Habermas' notion of 'interaction'.
'Interaction' or 'communicative action' is based on
"intersubjectively shared understandings stemming from reciprocal
expectations developed by 'consensual norms' of the kind in existence in
'traditional societies.' "74 A linguistically shared understanding of a
situation becomes the base for action. Through communicative language
society reflects changes in economic models at the same time that
economics reflect changes in society.
The primary change in society was the development ofrationalism, which gave rise to a theory of equivalence. This law of equivalence
permeated all aspects of rational society, especially, as Milovanovic
suggests, in the legal sphere:
It was here that it was given an ideal expression in such
constitutional principles as formal equality. And with
this process underway - that is, with the system generated model forms being increasingly duplicated 7•• combined with hegemonic groups actively generating myths
substantiating the righteousness of the prevailing socioeconomic conditions, the insoluble conflict, or the necessity of class struggle is more likely to disappear for the
consciousness at one level. 75

Although on one level formal equality in law undermines the
likelihood of class conflict, on another level it leads logically to conflict.
As suggested above, capitalist economy has developed from a laissezfaire system to one requiring substantial state interference in latecapitalist society. Central to the state's role has been the enforcement
of these notions of equivalency and formal equality.
In late capitalist society, state intervention becomes necessary
to curtail the excesses and antimonies which would develop naturally in
capitalist society. For example, this state intervention can take the form
of anti-combines legislation: "the state actively develops an ideology that
unifies all as citizens with formal rights."76 As Kennedy notes, increasingly these rights are being used to subvert the very process they were
designed to serve:
Others within the structural Marxist perspectives, not
denying the importance of economic as one factor [in
mediating changing social and legal structures], point
out the significance of relatively independent factors
found within the superstructures, i.e., the logic of the
legal form itselfunfolding; shifting coalitions within the
power bloc; contradictory concerns felt by higher level
courts expressed in formulated ideologies justifying existing social economic and political arrangements; col-
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lective oppositional action such as union, women's liberation, civil rights, anti-nuke movements, and so forth.
These are not without effect. 77
The Marxist critique of the origin oflaw stresses the contradictions over which capitalism glosses; yet these contradictions are essential if capitalism is to maintain its place in society. The Marxist critique
of the origin oflaw can be stated succinctly: in capitalist society, law is
inextricably connected with economics and politics, and following from
that, law cannot be an autonomous and apolitical 'Platonic' construct as
suggested by legal formalists.
An interpellative/structuralist Marxist notion of the origin of
law has much in common with Derrida's critique of Rousseau's theory of
the origin oflaw. Like Derrida, who showed that neither the morality nor
the interdict could be posited as a first cause, the Marxist critique
suggests that law is not an autonomous body that exists independent of
society. Law could not have developed independently of capitalist
society as the legal formalists claim, any more than society could have
developed without law. Thus law and society operate in a natural
dialectic; law transforms society, and the social changes demand accommodation in law. When one is privileged over the other, as in early
capitalist society in which capital was privileged over law, contradictions arise. While in later capitalist society, this dialectic has shifted
with law attaining greater power over capital, the contradictions have
not been eradicated.
As one class increasingly dominated economically, there occured
a recourse to a formalist notion of equality in order to justify the
inequality in practice. Each person was accorded equal rights under the
law, even if they could not exercise these rights in practice. This posed
two problems. First, in order to secure personal freedoms, state intervention and suppression of freedoms became necessary. Second, the
oppressed classes responded to the formal equalities given them to
subvert the system of legal hegemony.
From this, one can draw two conclusions: one, as Derrida
suggests, law is not inherently prohibitory or negative; and two, that in
order to continue its oppression, a ruling elite will continually need to
resort to increasingly draconian laws or violence. The connection between these two notions is explored at greater length by Derrida in the
Cardozo lecture. In drawing together the deconstructionistic and Marxist views on the origin of law several common ideas arise: law cannot
exist apart from society, but only exists in a dialectical relation with
other factors (for example, the economy) within society; law and semiotics are closely linked to use and exchange values of commodities; and
only by understanding the origins of law can we begin to take some
control of its future.
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THE FUNCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF LAW
In the discussion of the origin of law, it was said that law's
inception was closely bound up with its functions. Here, the emphasis
is on the functions and functioning of law, but, once again, one must
remember that there is a great deal of overlap between these notions. In
discussing the functions and functioning oflaw, one must, thus, keep in
mind what was said concerning the origins oflaw.

Deconstruction and the Function(ing) of Law
In his lecture entitled "Force of Law", Derrida begins with a
study of the English expression 'to enforce the law' or 'enforceability of
the law or contract'. Implicit in this expression is the notion that law is
always an authorized force, that it is "a force that justifies itself or is
justified in applying itself, even if this justification may be judged from
elsewhere to be unjust or unjustifiable."78 Law and enforcement are not
and cannot be separated:

There are, to be sure, laws that are not enforced, but
there is no law without enforceability and no applicability or enforceability of the law without force, whether
this force be direct or indirect, physical or symbolic,
exterior or interior, brutal or subtly discursive and
hermeneutic, coercive or regulative, and so forth.79
This leads to the question of the connection between law and violence.
Derrida notes the texts of Heidegger in whose work one often
finds the word 'Gewalt', which in English and French is often translated
as violence. Yet, as Derrida suggests, in German this expression
signifies both "legitimate power, authority, and force" (for example,
gesetzgbende Gewalt or legislative power), as well as violent force. so Once
again we are confronted with the origins oflaw and justice.
Derrida approaches this question in his usual indirect manner.
In this case it is through a discussion of Pascal's pensees on justice and
Montaigne's passage which inspired it.
In a passage which has inspired many subsequent thinkers,
Montaigne wrote, "[a]nd so laws keep up their good standing, not
because they are just, but because they are laws; that is the mystical
foundation of their authority, they have no other."81 Pascal followed this
in his Pensee 293::
[O]ne man says that the essence of justice is the authority of the legislator, another that it is the convenience of
the King, another that it is the current custom; and the
latter is closest to the truth: simple reason tells us that
nothing is just in itself; everything crumbles with time.
Custom is the sole basis for equity, for the simple reason
that it is received; it is the mystical foundation of
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authority. Whoever traces it to its source annihilates
it.82
Derrida draws our attention to two points: the distinction drawn
between law and justice; and the 'mystical authority' of law. Derrida
suggests that in the realization that law's authority is only 'mystical' one
finds a key element in the critique of juridical ideology. It is the key to
"the desedimentation of the superstructure of law that both hide and
reflect the economic and political interests of the dominant forces of
society."83
In short, Derrida suggests that the function oflaw is bound up
with its form as law. In Rosenfeld's paper, he discusses how the form
ascribed to law can circumscribe its functions. He looks particularly at
the school of legal formalism, and while questioning its ultimate value
for the future, he suggests that with some modification it could be doing
more to bring law up to par with the rest of our dynamic and evolving
society.
Rosenfeld's main concern centres on legal interpretation. More
precisely, he rejects traditional forms of legal formalism and replaces
them with new forms of legal formalism informed by a deconstructive
hermeneutic (method of interpretation). Traditional formalism argues
that application of a rule oflaw leads to a determinable outcome "due to
the constraints imposed by the language of the rule".84 Conversely, the
new legal formalism sees law as both dynamic, and in many important
respects, distinct from politics. Even among the writers whose work to
date has, in some respects, approximated this new legal formalism, (for
example, Stanley Fish and Ernest Weinreib), Rosenfeld finds sufficient
flaws to reject these theories.
He praises the 'formalism' of Stanley Fish for the recognition
that law-making involves a double-gesture, in that "[l]aw must absorb
and internalize that which threatens it from the outside, ... [b]ut, at the
same time, ... must deny that it is appropriating extra-legal values."85
But Rosenfeld ultimately rejects Fish's model as a result of its
overidentification of law with rhetoric "which is more in tune with the
conception of deconstruction as an interpretive technique" only.86
Notwithstanding Weinrib's assertion that law is autonomous of
politics, he nonetheless offers a number of insights. Weinrib's use of the
concepts of corrective and distributive justice87 is valuable, allowing for
a distinction between past and present, between self and other, without
the necessity of a separation between them. It is sufficient here to say
that Rosenfeld rejects Weinrieb's model for its parallel to Kantian ethics,
in which the self is 'subordinated to the universal',88 but Weinrib's
influence on Rosenfeld's conclusions should not be underestimated. As
Rosenfeld states:
First, there is no single formula or form which underlies
all juridical relationships or which could be relied upon
to draw any clear cut boundaries between law and
politics. Second, law as a practice is distinct from other
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practices but not self-contained, as it borrows and
incorporates elements from other social practices, and
as it partially overlaps with such other practices ... Third,
the law's distinct existence is not given, but must be
constantly fought for, through a dynamic process of
differentiation operating in a specific social and historical context and constrained by the requirement ofintegrity. 89
Rosenfeld concludes that the 'external reconciliation' promised
by a law which has internalized some aspects of deconstruction is to be
valued, but he leaves open the question of its more far-reaching implications for law:
Perhaps the limitations of law could be overcome by
supplementing its external relationships with internal
relationships capable of fostering greater intimacy and
solidarity between self and other. Perhaps, however, the
ontological and ethical demands of deconstruction require the erasure of the distinction between external
and internal relationships which may require superseding the very order established by law.90
As much as the function oflaw informed and was informed by its
origin, so too, the function oflaw informs and is informed by its future.
The point is that in a deconstructionist conception, law cannot be
considered simply as it exists today. It needs a consideration of both the
present demands of an awareness of its history, and of an expectation for
its future. In its insistence upon viewing law in its historical development, Rosenfeld's criticism of legal formalism and Derrida's notion of
law share much with the Marxist theorists who have preceded them.

Marxism and the Function(ing) of Law
The Hegelian dialectic subsumes difference into similarity and
identity. This, he accomplished, through the imposition ofan ahistorical,
and ultimately onto-theological, teleology.91 The Marxist dialectic differs in that it is rooted in history, and is based on difference (manifested
as class inequality and opposition).92 For Marx, capitalist society
attempts to cover up this opposition or difference through the imposition
of equivalency in the marketplace:
Capitalism, therefore, requires an idealizing operation
that abstracts from inequality, identifies difference, and
resolves seriality into a paradigm. That operation is a
concrete version of the classical speculative dialectic.
The aspect of the dialectic which Marx saw as being more
helpful emphasizes the heterogeneity or scission internal to capitalism ... 'In its mystified form,' he says, the
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'dialectic seemed to transfigure and to glorify what
exists.' But as Marx uses it, it includes a recognition of
the 'inevitable destruction' of 'what exists.'93
This notion of mystification has been employed by Marxist legal theorists to explain how law manages to preserve its privileged place in the
superstructure. 94
An overdeterministic view would hold that the mystification of
law is part of the ideological function that law serves in protecting
capitalism. This ideological function is but one of three that instrumentalist Marxists attribute to law. The others are the facilitative and
repressive functions.
The facilitative functions oflaw include: (1) a system of integration and coordination; (2) legal transactions (exchange); (3) the regulation of conflict; and (4) the realization of social values. 95 In short, these
functions govern the everyday running of society. They are so pervasive
that they have attained an autonomy of sorts, and a power to shape the
people within the system. Such is the power of the facilitative functions
of law "that logically formal rational law integrates the individual to
system needs and not the system to human needs."96
The repressive function of law follows from its facilitative role.
As discussed above, for interpellative Marxists, late capitalism is characterized by contradictions requiring the intervention of the legal
system (for example, through the increase in state regulation). In
seeking to cover over the fissures in the system, what the judiciary
provides is "the logic for the continued domination of the non-propertied"97
Just as the repressive function is closely connected to the
facilitative function, so too is the ideological function derived from the
repressive function. The repressive function oflaw is legitimatizing or
justificatory. Here, the connection to semiotics is most evident.
A critical semiotextual analysis oflaw begins with the notion of
a "tension between formal constraints imposed by the linguistic form on
one hand, and pragmatism (linguistic forms in use) and subjectivity
(need to objectify and externalize internal thoughts, feelings ... etc.) on
the other."98 As deconstructionists recognize, language is not neutral,
but an articulation of an ideology, or at least, an articulation containing
an ideology. As C.W. Mills writes, "a vocabulary is not merely a string
of words, imminent within it are societal textures - institutional and
political coordinates."99 In the over-deterministic model, these coordinates are developed by superstructural practices, most notably
juridico-political practices.
Milovanovic argues that the two spheres or functions oflinguistic production and linguistic circulation can be seen here. Linguistic
production entails giving content to signs, while linguistic circulation
involves establishing those signs in popular culture.100 As the legal
superstructure has assumed greater proportions in late capitalist society, legal discourse has become increasingly common and influential
even among those granted 'formal' equality rights.
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In his introduction to Grundrisse, Marx spoke not only of the
fetishization of commodities as necessary for the development, but also
of a "linguistic community" which would allow the capital fetishization
to develop.101 The birth of capitalism required both the fetishization of
commodities and of language. As Milovanovic concludes:

a homologous development exists between the commodity, legal and linguistic form. A double obfuscation
exists. At the first level, once linguistic codes are
established and once the grammar of a language are in
place in circumscribed linguistic co-ordinate systems,
linguistic workers situating themselves within them are
limited in structuring cognitive process.102
In applying this to legal practice, the obvious effects are two-fold.
First, it allows an occupational elite (the judiciary of the superior courts)
who reflect a certain class structure to control legalistic production.
Second, it encourages internalization of these norms by the oppressed
classes by limiting their linguistic avenues of opposition.103
For both the deconstructionist and the Marxist, the function(ing)
oflaw is closely linked to the form oflaw. Derrida suggests that iflaw
arises as a justifiable force, this character already determines in large
measure its function. Once created, the function becomes the justification for the continued existence of the law. This is picked up by Rosenfeld
in his critique of the 'double-gesture' oflegal formalism, which necessarily internalizes social facts, but cannot admit of doing so for fear oflosing
its autonomy and legitimacy. This idea that law subsumes various
functions into itself is closely connected to the Marxist critique of the
Hegelian dialectic, and the Marxist critique oflaw.
An overdeterministic Marxist view of law suggests that in
capitalist society, law seeks to keep several functions to itself: the
ideological, the facilitative, and the repressive. While each supports the
others, all are dependant upon the ability of the dominant class to control
discourse. While the deconstructionists maintain that the imposition of
constraints on language precipitates the use of force, the Marxists
suggest that the imposition of force can only be legitimated by controlling
language and discourse.

THE FUTURE OF LAW
In his discussion of the functions oflaw, Rosenfeld suggests that
in the short term a new formalism could be envisioned which would allow
some progress to be made in development oflaw. Yet, he also questions
whether even this revised formalism would be adequate for society's
long-term development. In this section, I propose a brief suggestion of
what the future may hold for law. As Rosenfeld suggests, it involves a
radically different notion oflaw and society.
As we have seen already, in "White Mythology" Derrida suggests
that society both reflects and is reflected by its metaphysics. In Western
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society, that metaphysic is that of the white Indo-European, rationalist
male. Although in recent years law has attained more autonomy from
economics, it has also played a greater role in maintaining this structure.
A deconstructionist hermeneutic would share with an interpellative
Marxist critique the view that such a concept oflaw is not necessary, any
more than is the social structure which gives rise to it. Based on the
foregoing discussions of the origin and function on law, a brief outline of
a differential understanding oflaw and society which is compatible with
a structuralist Marxist notion is presented.

Deconstruction and the Future of Law
It has been seen that Derrida rejects the standard view of law
and society which suggests that law is both autonomous and prohibitive.
Further, he clearly distinguishes between justice and law (droit), but
says the two are necessarily joined. He writes:

Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground,
the position of the law can't by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a violence
without ground. Which is not to say that they are in
themselves unjust, in the sense of "illegal." They are
neither legal nor illegal in their founding moment. They
exceed the opposition between founded and unfounded,
or between any foundationalism or
antifoundationalism.104
When laws are given effect in society, however, they lose this
balance. At this point, law becomes deconstructible because it is founded
either "on interpretable and transformable textual strata ... , or because
its ultimate foundation is by definition unfounded."105 This is in contrast
with justice, which like deconstruction, Derrida holds is necessarily
beyond deconstruction. He concludes:

1. The deconstructibility oflaw (droit), oflegality, legitimacy or legitimation (for example) makes deconstruction
possible. 2. The undeconstructability of justice also
makes deconstruction possible, indeed is inseparable
from it. 3. The result: deconstruction takes place in the
interval that separates the undeconstructability of justice from the deconstructability of droit (authority, legitimacy, and so on).106
Derrida ascribes this deconstructability of traditional law at least partly
to the fact that law is normative, while justice is always based on the
individual.
Since justice is based on the individual, if law is to function
justly, the individual must be able to understand the law. Yet, as
suggested above, this is not always the case. There are many concrete
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examples of people tried and convicted who had little understanding of
the language in which they were tried. In such a case, the injustice to the
individual is obvious, but Derrida suggests this has larger ontological
and societal consequences:
The violence of this injustice that consists of judging
those who don't understand the idiom in which one
claims ... "justice is done,'' ... is not just any violence, any
injustice. This injustice supposes that the other, the
victim of the language's injustice, is capable of a language in general, is a man as a speaking animal, in the
sense that we, men, give to this word language. Moreover, there was a time, not long ago and not yet over, in
which "we, men" meant "we adult white male Europeans, carnivorous and capable of sacrifice."107
In short, a deconstructionist approach to law involves necessarily a reconsideration of what law is, but it does not stop there.
Deconstruction demands a reconsideration of basic notions of ontology,
which in turn demands continual reconsideration of society and
criteriology.
Once again, Derrida warns that the application of the supplement to society should not lead to "quasi-nihilistic abdication before the
ethico-politico-juridical question of justice", but to a positive understanding of the role oflaw in societyios. Derrida resists efforts to reduce
the deconstructionist approach to a regulative scheme, although it
surely involves this. This law, however, must be reinterpreted and reinvented with every case. Law can have no horizon but may have an
"avenir, a 'to come"', which Derrida distinguishes from the future which
can always "reproduce the present".109
A deconstructionist notion oflaw sees law as always and necessarily 'differential'; law is spatially and temporally relative. In practical
terms, it means that law cannot be seen as an autonomous entity
existing outside society, but it is connected necessarily to the process of
politicization. As Derrida claims, law is:
interminable even if it cannot and should not ever be
total. To keep this from being a truism or a triviality, we
must recognize in it the following consequence: each
advance in politicization obliges one to reconsider, and
so to reinterpret the very foundations oflaw such as they
had previously been calculated or delimited. no
It should be stressed that the politicization of law clearly does
not mean the reduction of law to politics. To isolate politics, and place
it above law, economics, or anything else would be merely to reform the
scientific Marxism which has already been rejected. Thus, it would be
necessarily incompatible with Derridean deconstruction and the form(s)of
Marxism favoured here.
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Marxism and the Future of Law
Traditionally, Marxist theories have posited an end to the
capitalist system, its replacement by socialism, and its ultimate fulfillment
in the development of the communist state. In spite of this notion of a
final stage, it would be wrong to consider this notion as metaphysical.
This can be shown by comparing Marx's use of the terms 'socialism' and
'communism'.
The first stage- the development of state socialism- involves the
'dictatorship of the proletariat'. In legal terms, this means the imposition of a legal structure not different in nature from the existing
capitalist model, but with a different end. 111 Instead of supporting a
bourgeois notion of society, the structures of law would be used to
support the interests of the proletariat. This involves the return of use
values in place of exchange values which have been privileged under
capitalism. Once the law has been established, it can be used to bring
about a change in ethics, which it is asserted will bring about an end to
the law. This marks the beginning of the last phase of society: communism.
In the Leninist-Marxist idea of communism, state and law, (at
least in their bourgeois incarnations), wither away. As Lenin suggests,
in the highest form of communism people will become:
accustomed to observing the elementary rules of social
intercourse that have been known for centuries ... they
will become accustomed to observing them without force,
without compulsion, without subordination, without the
special apparatus for compulsion which is called the
state.112
There will no doubt be transgressions of the social order, but
"spontaneous controls" will arise to deal with these as the need arises.113
Of course, this would involve not the entire class acting together, but
small collectivist organizations working independently for the common
purpose.
Although many would dismiss such talk as utopian, Milovanovic
responds to the critics in two ways. First, he asserts that these
organizations do exist and are growing. Second, he contends that what
has been predicted, namely the rebirth of substantive rationality in law,
has been evidenced within many of these organizations. As proof, he
points to the 1976 study of these collectives done by Joyce WhittRothschild.
In 1976, these collectivist organizations numbered around 5,000
and were on the increase.114 In her study of these groups, WhittRothschild listed eight factors common to them:
( 1) Authority ... resides ... in the collectivity as a whole.
The collective tries to reach a consensus on issues rather
than talking formal motions.
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(2) Rules are minimized in this new type of organization.
Decisions are made as cases arise. Substantive rather
than formal values dictate process.
(3) Social control relies on 'personalistic and moralistic
appeals' rather than on centralized authority.
(4) Social relations ... 'strive toward the ideal of community. Relationships are to be holistic, affective, and of
value in themselves'.
(5) Recruitment and advancement are based on friendship and social/political values.
(6) Incentive structures rest on 'value-purposive' action
where value fulfillment in itself is paramount; material
incentives are not central. In fact, pay is according to
'need'. ..
(7) Social stratification rather than hierarchical is egalitarian... In the collectivist organizations studied ... a
ratio between highest and lowest paid was never greater
than two to one.
(8) As far as differentiation of work roles, the ... organization places the highest value on holistic orientations to
work. Thus through (a) rotating roles, (b) sharing tasks
and team work, and (c) maintaining ... education to
offset tendencies that maintain ... differentiated/specialized roles, the ... organization maintains an environment in which non-bureaucratic values are reinforced.115
Such may be idealistic, but an ideal is not by definition impossible to attain. Nor is the notion of the ideal society as outlined here
incompatible with a deconstructionist notion of society, although admittedly the term ideal might be problematic. Ryan has suggested 'differential socialism' as a more appropriate term.
Central to the notion of 'differential socialism' is the concept of
'interactive adaptation.' 11 6 In brief, interactive adaptation entails a
critique of the contemporary monadic view of society, the obliteration of
the distinction between theory and action, an attempt at genuine
pluralism, and of course, a new conception oflaw.
A deconstructionist notion oflaw demands a reconsideration of
the ontology oflaw, and relation between law and society. Law must
become more consonant with justice, which demands a change in the way
law is applied. It cannot simply be a set of a priori rules which will apply
to all people in all places and at all times. Law must achieve a balance
between predictability and sensitivity to situation which it has heretofore lacked. This demands a sensitivity to changing time and locale, but
also an awareness of the differing needs of people based on race, religion,
and gender, to name but a few of the many factors.
This notion of 'differential socialism' - ofradical alterity applied
to society - bears many similarities to the notion of communism, the
'penultimate stage' of social development found in Marxist theory. Here
the words 'penultimate stage' are in quotation marks to stress that in the
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Marxist model, communism is neither fully 'the final stage' nor really a
stage at all. The Marxist model requires the movement to small-scale
differentially-based communities with laws which must balance the
ever-changing intracommunal and intercommunal needs.
CONCLUSION

Adam Smith's contradictions are of significance because they contain
problems which it is true he does not resolve, but which he reveals by
contradicting himself
Karl Marx 117
As the above quotation suggests the notion of contradiction
played a central role in the thought of Marx. In praxis, these ruptures
would bring about the downfall of capitalism, while in theory they
provide the loci of attack. Such a critique shares much with the
Derridean school of deconstruction. The deconstructionist critique of
literature and society attempts to show the contradictions underlying
traditional structuralist thought - contradictions which the prevailing
philosophies suppress necessarily through recourse to metaphysics or
violence.
As suggested at the outset, that considerable similarities exist
between the Marxist and the deconstructionistic critiques of society
should not come as a surprise to anyone with a familiarity with the
writings of Marx or Derrida. Although they began their respective
careers in different fields, both begin their works with a rejection of the
Hegelian idealism. Through their writings, they both sought to apply
this inverted dialectic to social theory. Since both recognized the role
that law has played and continues to play in perpetuating social norms,
it is not surprising that their respective theories oflaw manifest a great
many similarities.
With respect to the origins of law, both suggest that law is
inseparable from the society in which it exists. Whether it is done
through an ontological critique of Rousseau's origin oflaw, or a historical-economic analysis of early capitalism, the notion of law as an
autonomous object acting upon society from the outside is clearly
rejected. Instead, Marx and Derrida view law as both a factor in
determining ideology and as a repository for these views. Here Derrida,
echoing Montaigne and Pascal, sees law as operating in a 'mystifying'
way. The notion of 'mystification' is also central to a Marxist critique of
law and economics.
In interpellative structuralist Marxism, law is but one part of
the superstructure which interacts with the economy to form society. As
capitalism has developed from a use-oriented system to one based on
exchange, law has taken on different and greater functions. These
include the facilitative, repressive and ideological functions. Fundamental to contemporary Marxist notions of ideology is the role that
language and literature play in circumscribing discourse and dissent.
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For Derrida, the future of law cannot be separated from the
future of society, and vice versa. Thus a deconstructive analysis oflaw
involves a deconstruction of society, and vice versa. In Derrida's notion
of a differential society, law, like society, will be more egalitarian and
open-ended. There will be less bureaucracy and less emphasis on the
prohibitive dimension of law, because people will evolve beyond the
stage ofrelying on it as we do today. Similarly, in Marxist theory, the
transformation from capitalism to state socialism to communism will be
accompanied by a change in human nature. At the same time that
society is moving away from centralized bureaucratic state agencies,
people will begin to move towards collective values characterized by use
values in exchange. Thus for both deconstructionism and Marxism, law
as it exists today will wither away, and be replaced by a system
characterized by informal gatherings of small groups.
In conclusion, it might be said that the critics who suggest that
Ryan's term 'differential socialism' is an oxymoron are clearly mistaken.
If anything, I suggest that using both terms may indeed be redundant.
APPENDIX 118
To understand fully the implications of such a view demands an
understanding of the dialectical theories to which deconstructionism is
related, but ultimately rejects. Among the most important are Hegel's
dialectic and the Heideggerian 'destruction of being'.
Hegel analogizes his onto-theological theory with the relationship of a text with its preface. His notion of the relationship between the
two = signifier/signified, where the"=" he calls the Aufhebung:

Aufhebung is a relationship between two terms where
the second at once annuls the first and lifts it up into a
higher sphere of existence; it is a hierarchical concept
generally translated as 'sublation' and now sometimes
translated 'sublimation.' A successful preface is
aufgehoben into the text it precedes, just as a word is
aufgehoben into its meaning.119
Here, the reason for the deconstructionist rejection- the recourse to a
higher plane- is obvious. It is less so, but no less problematic in the work
of Martin Heidegger to whom Derrida often refers.
In Zur Seinfrage Heidegger outlines his concept of 'Being under
erasure,' (simultaneous being and non-being) which he represents by
Being.120 Being represents a rejection of the pre-comprehended notion of
being, which Heidegger, like Derrida later, is forced to confront as a
result of the general problem of language and metaphysics (once one
applies a word, one has in some sense 'captured' what really cannot be
captured). Yet, here is where the similarities to Derrida's work end:
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To be sure, when Heidegger sets Being before all concepts, he is attempting to free language from the fallacy
of a fixed origin, which is also a fixed end.121
But, in a certain way, he also sets up Being as what Derrida calls the
"transcendental signified." For whatever a concept might "mean,"
anything that is conceived of in its being-present must lead us to the
already-answered question of Being. In that sense, the sense of the final
reference, Being is indeed the final signified to which all signifiers refer.
But Heidegger makes it clear that Being cannot be contained by, is
always prior to, indeed transcends, signification. It is therefore a
situation where the signified commands, and is yet free of, all signifiersa recognizably theological situation.
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